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A VERDICT ON CORPORATE LIABILITY RULES
AND THE DERIVATIVE SUIT:
NOT PROVEN
Charles J. Goetz t
Most of what Fischel and Bradley (F&B) argue in their paper is
useful, interesting, and frequently persuasive.' In such a provoca-
tive paper on a controversial subject, one expects-and finds-some
observations that are ultimately unconvincing. In order to get on
with the commentator's assigned task of dredging up possible weak
points, I shall dispense praise only briefly. It would nonetheless be
unfortunate and unintended if this overall focus on reservations
about certain of F&B's arguments were taken as evidence of sub-
stantial disagreement with the major thrust of their discussion. At
best, they have enlightened me, and at worst, they have perplexed
me.
A major contribution of F&B's work is that the authors raise the
right issues. One aspect of this flows out of the recognition that
alleged violations of management duties may be analyzed from the
perspective of contract rather than that of tort. Contract law is gen-
erally permissive. It provides "off the rack" rules that parties can
tailor to their own needs by adding express terms that supplement
or "trump" features of whatever relationship the law has preformu-
lated for them.2 One can imagine a variety of ways in which differ-
t Joseph M. Hartfield Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1961, Provi-
dence College; Ph.D. 1965, University of Virginia.
1 Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
F&B].
2 "Preformulated" contractual provisions are discussed in Goetz & Scott, The Miti-
gation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971
(1983). Parties' ability to restructure any preformulation of their agreements has been a
continuing theme of this author's collaboration with Robert Scott. See Goetz & Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1089-91 (1981) (examining individ-
ual contractual devices in cases where future unknown contingencies impede optimal
risk allocation at time of contracting); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the
Just Compensation Principle, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 588 n.87 (1977) (parties create alter-
natives to "off the rack" contract rules when costs of typical contractual rules exceed
costs of individualized negotiations). Many other contemporary scholars also build on
the notion of permissiveness in contract law. See, e.g., A. SCHWARTZ & R. Sco-rr, COM-
MERCIAL TRANSACTONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 19-23 (1982) (examining several com-
mon commercial disputes using UCC interpretation principles); Baird & Weisberg,
Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217
(1982) (common law "mirror-image rule" allowed parties greater flexibility to adapt
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ent groups of stockholders might wish to structure the agent-
principal relationship with managers. Some of the major rules
courts apply to corporate managers, however, seem to be relatively
fixed features of the legal landscape. Since stockholders are the pre-
sumed beneficiaries of the rules in question, F&B rightly raise the
fundamental question: are these the rules that stockholders really
want and value, or are they arbitrary and wasteful judicial artifacts?
The answer to this important question is perhaps more difficult to
derive than F&B acknowledge, however.
A second general contribution of F&B's work is their insistence
that commentators evaluate alternative responses to agent-principal
problems in terms of a criterion fabled, at least in the Goetz house-
hold, as the "As compared to what?" standard.3 In the real world,
solutions to complex problems are all likely to suffer from major
flaws. It is a snare for the unwary to argue that a solution that per-
mits certain "abuses" is ipso facto a bad choice. In truth, the least
bad choice is necessarily a comparatively good policy choice.
Most of my reservations about F&B's analysis stem from the au-
thors' lapses in tracing out all the alternative pathways of their own
methodological road map. Unlike this author, F&B have a sophisti-
cated and fully matured view of the corporate law terrain. While in
most respects this is surely an advantage to them, it raises the dan-
ger that they see the expected bushes, shrubs, and trees where more
naive eyes see only shadowy mists and lumpy boulders. In a few
important instances their rationales for policy implications seem lit-
tle or no more plausible than counter-rationales with dramatically
different policy implications.
I
THE EMPIRICAL TEST
An initial puzzle arises because of the significance that F&B at-
tribute to their empirical study of the effect of derivative case dis-
contract terms to their needs than does Uniform Commercial Code);Jackson, "Anticipa-
tory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract
Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 98 n.91 (1978) (con-
tract law provides rules suitable in most cases but allows individuals to agree to deviate).
Some insufficiently acknowledged drawbacks to this permissiveness are analyzed in
Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Goetz &
Scott, Expanded Choice].
3 F&B admit, for example, that special litigation committees are an imperfect
method of decisionmaking. They conclude, nonetheless, that the costs of unmeritorious
derivative suits outweigh the disadvantages of giving a management-appointed commit-
tee the power to terminate litigation. See F&B, supra note 1, at 274.
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missals on stock prices.4 First, it is not clear what one's a priori
expectation should be about the direction of the effect purportedly
measured. There is no reason to reject in principle the possibility
that some derivative suits are wealth-maximizing and others are not.
A court's dismissal of a suit might generate either an abnormal posi-
tive or negative return depending on the particular factual context
of the case. By averaging the individual cases in their sample, F&B
conceivably allow dissimilar announcement effects to net out against
each other. Although their data presumably permit statistical test-
ing for unusual price movement of any kind, i.e., without regard to
algebraic sign, F&B do not report any findings on this arguably
more relevant point.
A second problem with F&B's study is that the price-impact test
they use implicitly presupposes that the dismissals are new informa-
tion to the market. If, instead, investors' expectation of a dismissal
has already substantially "leaked" into the stock's evaluation, there
would be no reason to anticipate any market reaction at all. Thus,
what F&B might be measuring is the effect of announcements de-
void of significant information rather than the real impact of the
suits themselves.
Finally, it is less than obvious what magnitude of price effect
ought to be observable, even if we assume that (1) derivative suits
do enter the market's calculus in some systematic way and (2) the
dismissal announcements are genuinely new information. At most,
a dismissal alters the investors' preexisting expected value of a fu-
ture income stream. What kinds of success probabilities are relevant
for suits that survive such dismissals? What potential magnitudes of
recovery are involved? Perhaps most important, however, is the is-
sue of the normative implications that may be derived from evidence
of negligible price effect. Does the absence of impact mean that de-
rivative suits are "neutral," a nonproblem? Because F&B would an-
swer the latter question in the negative, this author is uncertain why
they seem so cheerful about their reported empirical results.
II
INTERPRETING THE FACTS: AN ALTERNATIVE
CHARACTERIZATION
If we were certain that the market value of a stock typically falls
when a derivative suit is filed and rises when the suit is dismissed,
what could or should we conclude from this information? Presuma-
bly F&B would interpret these facts as strong evidence of what they
4 Id. at 282 ("[O]ur results indicate that derivative suits are not an important moni-
toring device to curb managerial malfeasance.").
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illuminatingly discuss as minority-rule suits: actions that are not
cost-effective and are therefore inconsistent with the wealth max-
imization goal of the average stockholder. 5 Under this interpreta-
tion, if stockholders were free to structure corporate liability rules
contractually, they would enhance their wealth by limiting such
suits. One such limiting device is the litigation council, a filter on
unprofitable suits, and therefore arguably a desirable institution.
F&B's inference is plausible, but one can posit and defend another
scenario with precisely opposite policy implications.
The alternative scenario can be illustrated by a two-step game-
theory model, wherein the manager first chooses whether to be hon-
est and then stockholders choose how to react. Suppose that a po-
tentially deviant 6 corporate manager views his payoff matrices as
having a form similar to Exhibit I. 7 The matrix indicates that the
manager's returns depend on a combination of his own conduct and
whether the stockholders sue him if he cheats. The exact numbers
are not important, but their relative magnitudes are: a key element
of the game's structure is that the manager maximizes his payoff by
cheating when he does not expect retaliatory suit.
Exhibit I
Payoff Matrix for the Manager
Manager's Conduct Stockholder's Reaction
No Suit Suit
Conform 90 na
Cheat 100 70
Exhibit II shows the analogous payoff matrix for the stockhold-
ers. Again, only the relative magnitudes of the numbers are impor-
tant. The shareholders maximize their payoff when the manager is
honest and there is no occasion for legal action. If the manager
5 Id. at 271-74 (contrasting ability of any shareholder to bring a derivative suit with
general majority-rule system of corporate governance).
6 F&B's paper provides a good discussion of the difficulties in defining the obliga-
tions of the manager. It follows that the term "deviant" conceals a multitude of
problems. Id. at 264-65.
7 The intent of this matrix is to depict a manager who is susceptible to the lure of
dishonest behavior but recognizes the prospect of legal liability. Of course, other con-
siderations such as a sense of honor, guilt, or concern for reputation may influence the
perceived payoffs to a degree that any legal sanctions become irrelevant. Although legal
sanctions may have little relevance to the conduct of most managers, it makes sense to
focus here on at least that subset for whom legal incentives matter. Obviously, the game
in the text oversimplifies the real world in other respects, but it captures the essential
flavor of a real behavioral dilemma.
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cheats, however, a stockholder suit is not cost-effective. If the stock-
holders choose to litigate, the stock market will reduce the value of
the firm's stock because the suit exacerbates the loss from the man-
ager's conduct.
Exhibit II
Payoff Matrix for Stockholder
Stockholder's Reaction Manager's Conduct
Conform Cheat
No Suit 100 70
Suit na 60
If stockholders rationally assess the returns from a suit, manag-
ers should have no fear of retaliatory litigation. The predicted re-
sult of the game is that managers cheat and stockholders fail to sue.
Ironically, stockholders would be better off if they irrevocably com-
mitted themselves to "irrationally" suing whenever a manager
cheats. Managers would then choose to conform to their obliga-
tions, litigation would be unnecessary, and stockholders would max-
imize their payoffs. Stockholders can threaten management by
announcing an intention to litigate, but the threat is not very credi-
ble; once the cheating manager calls the stockholders' bluff, wealth-
maximizing stockholders will "forget" the threat and refrain from
suing.8 In this scenario the presence of a small stockholder group
that may sue on "principle," or because of some other motive that
deviates from Exhibit II, takes on special significance as an element
of the bluffing game. Exposing management to a significant pros-
pect of suit by uncontrollable gadflies may therefore have a certain
bizarre but powerful deterrent logic that benefits majority
stockholders. 9
This last scenario provides a theory that is entirely consistent
8 This assumes that the game is not frequently iterated. If stockholders were ex-
posed to cheating frequently, it would be rational to engage in loss-exacerbating suits,
thus earning a reputation for unreasonable litigiousness and making up any transient
losses through future deterrence of managerial cheating.
9 The logic of this scenario is quite similar to the strategies of retaliatory precom-
mitment dealt with in some of the "nonlegal enforcement" contract literature alluded to
by F&B. See F&B, supra note 1, at 263 n.7. This reasoning also is similar to the underly-
ing point of an article co-authored by Fischel which discusses precommitment strategies
of nonresistance to takeover bids. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Viewed once a
takeover offer has materialized, nonresistance is an apparently irrational policy that low-
ers the buy-out price. But viewed much earlier in time, the nonresistance commitment
arguably produces benefits that outweigh the loss because it reduces agency costs by
stimulating greater scrutiny of the company by hostile bidders.
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with the hypothesized empirical data. If a manager cheats, the insti-
tution of a derivative suit will be opposed by majority stockholders
because litigation will depress the stock value. The devaluation of
the firm's stock, however, only reflects the excess burden of a failed
precommitment deterrent. If we focus only on such diminutions in
value, we will fail to account for the possibility of overbalancing ben-
efits of the successful deterrent precommitments which eliminate
cheating and lawsuits. Thus, rational wealth-maximizing stockhold-
ers will ex ante choose to allow derivative suits, even if they occa-
sionally have good reason to regret the commitment ex post when
the deterrent fails to work.
III
OTHER AMBIGUITIES: "CONTRACTING AROUND" THROUGH
INSURANCE
The preceding section attempted to show that plausible alterna-
tive theories can generate conflicting normative implications from
the same set of facts. A similar plight befalls F&B's conclusions re-
garding the significance of management's ability to insure against
liability. At first blush, a strong case can be made for F&B's inter-
pretation of insurance as an attempt to "contract around" state-im-
posed liability rules.' 0 The authors impliedly assert that if
stockholders thought that management liability was in their best in-
terest they would not pay to nullify that liability by insuring their
managers against it. F&B's unstated conclusion can thus only be
that it would be simpler and more efficient just to abolish the liabil-
ity rules.
Again, a plausible alternative theory suffices to muddy the wa-
ters. The key to this alternative explanation is the use of external
parties for monitoring purposes. The use of external auditors is a
device that stockholders use to overcome a lack of both monitoring
incentives (the free rider problem) and monitoring expertise."I In-
surance companies can be used as an effective monitoring device.
Private individuals, whose insurance policies cover mainly property
of modest value, underestimate the amount of monitoring done by
the carriers of liability on large-exposure risks. For instance, com-
mercial buildings and warehouses are frequently the subject of in-
surance company inspections for fire and other safety hazards.
What better way exists to get an external expert to monitor one's
10 F&B, supra note 1, at 285 ("Indemnification and insurance allow firms to contract
around liability rules in certain circumstances.").
11 But see Judge Richard Posner's surprising opinion in Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (holding primary duty
to monitor inventory fraud was that of stockholders, not auditors).
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management than by giving it a large stake in the potential losses?
Thus, insurance is more than mere risk pooling or diversification; it
-educes risk by shifting the prospective loss to a party with a better
prospect of effectively monitoring the conduct that generates the
risk.12 Insurance acquisition could perhaps best be viewed as the
purchase of monitoring services rather than risk indemnification.
The existence of liability rules creates the insurable risk and the ex-
ternal monitoring opportunity. Hence, stockholders who opt for li-
ability insurance are not necessarily expressing a preference for
repealing the liability itself.
On a different but related tack, insurance cannot completely
cure excessively risk-averse behavior by managers. Indemnification
of the manager will never cover all costs, including the reputational
ones, of being sued. Therefore, the manager will still have powerful
incentives to avoid the risk of being sued-although he may care
less about the size of the damages being claimed.
IV
THE CARE-LOYALTY DISTINCTION: Is IT MEANINGFUL?
Contract methodology suggests that F&B are too quick to con-
demn the distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loy-
alty as one that is artificial. 13 Although all broad formulations have
an element of fuzziness to them, F&B do not convincingly prove
that factfinders are unable to distinguish conduct that breaches one
of these standards rather than the other.
If one concedes that the distinction between the duties is mean-
ingful, the only further test ought to be a practical one. A classifica-
tion is "artificial" only if no theoretical or empirical reason exists for
supposing that the parties affected by the rules might find it useful
to treat the two areas of conduct differently. Contrary to the posi-
tion of F&B, the legal system should be applauded for carving out
common understandings about principles of distinction that could
help parties articulate their relationships.1 4 From this perspective
one can defend the distinction between care and loyalty on a
number of grounds, including the differing ability ofjudges to iden-
12 In risk pooling, the expected value of the risk is unchanged, and the advantage
comes from reduction in its variance. Risk reduction actually reduces the probability of
the loss. See the discussion of different sources of least-cost risk bearing in C. GoETz,
LAw AND ECONOMICS (1984).
13 F&B, supra note 1, at 291. In an earlier draft of their paper F&B described the
distinction as "artificial." They remain critical of the distinction, however, and I persist
in my contention that the distinction has value.
14 See, for instance, the discussion of "invocations" in Goetz & Scott, Expanded
Choice, supra note 2, at 281-83.
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tify a failure of loyalty as opposed to one of care. 15
F&B's apparent hostility to the care-loyalty distinction may par-
tially stem from an inartful expression of their views. Their actual
discomfort is probably not with the distinction itself but rather the
particular kind of legal treatment that the courts and the ALI draft-
ers have grounded upon it. The rationales offered by the drafters
are, in truth, not entirely persuasive. Since the differential treat-
ment is mandatory rather than permissive, it certainly cannot claim
to have been validated by any revealed-usefulness test.
CONCLUSION
This author cannot claim to know much about corporate law,
and indeed, my knowledge has probably advanced by an embarrass-
ingly large fraction as a consequence of reflecting on F&B's paper.
The conflicting hypotheses in this reply are offered essentially in the
nature of a devil's advocate for the "not proven, tell me more"
camp. Indeed, some of what have been described above as conflict-
ing theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive; the real world
may be captured only by complex webs drawn from these separate
conceptual threads. The problem is one of finding an oversupply of
intellectually interesting theories among which it is difficult to
choose.
15 The law seems to find this distinction useful in other areas as well. In tort, for
instance, a potential rescuer is not generally held to a duty of loyalty to intervene. See W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984). If he does
intervene, however, courts may imply a duty of care. One reason for this may be quite
simply that courts are more comfortable at recognizing incompetent rescuers than they
are at balancing the reasons for nonintervention. Although one may wonder at why the
courts apparently take the opposite approach in treating this distinction within corpo-
rate law, the underlying principle of behavioral classification certainly seems
"meaningful".
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